









B	 as	we	proceed.	 Eventually	we	 replace	 all	 of	 the	 planks,	 so	 that	 the	 ship	 has	 been	
totally	refurbished.	But	then	we	assemble	the	planks	at	location	B	into	a	ship,	so	that	
there	are	two	ships	–	the	ship	that	we	started	with,	at	location	A,	and	the	ship	that	we	










planks;	 that	 the	 ship	 can	 gain	new	planks;	 that	 the	 ship	 can	have	a	plank	detached,	
moved	 and	 re-attached,	 all	 the	while	 staying	 part	 of	 the	 ship;	 that	 the	 ship	 can	 be	
totally	 refurbished	 (i.e.	 have	 all	 of	 its	 planks	 replaced);	 and	 that	 the	 ship	 can	 be	
disassembled	and	relocated.	Various	attempts	have	been	made	to	solve	or	dissolve	the	
puzzle	by	arguing	that	one	or	more	of	these	assumptions	is	false.	I	want	to	propose	a	















































of	 the	 original	 ship	 but	 is	 detached	 and	 moved.	 Similarly	 for	 when	 a	 new	 plank	 is	












and	movement	–	 its	position	and	movement	are	 compatible	with	both	 (a)	 the	plank	




























The	 question	 I	 want	 to	 answer	 is	 this:	 What	 does	 it	 take	 for	 an	 imparting	 or	 an	
exparting	to	occur?	
	
Note	 that	 I	 am	 not	 looking	 for	 an	 account	 of	 what	 parthood	 is	 –	 of	 what	 it	 is	 for	











At	 least,	 I	 make	 this	 proposal	 for	 impartings	 to	 and	 expartings	 from	 things	 such	 as	
ships,	bicycles,	cars,	chairs,	buildings,	bridges,	and	so	on.	I	do	not	make	it	for	animals,	
trees,	planets,	and	so	on	(at	least	not	in	this	paper).	I’m	not	sure	how	to	draw	a	sharp	





decision.	Perhaps	 it	should	be	an	 intention	–	 I’m	not	entirely	sure.	But	that	wouldn’t	























authority	 over	 your	 bell	 (unless	 you	 give	 me	 the	 appropriate	 authority).	 Nor	 can	 I	
decide	 that	 my	 bell	 is	 part	 of	 your	 bicycle,	 because	 I	 don’t	 have	 the	 appropriate	


















It	 will	 help	 to	 introduce	 some	 more	 terminology.	 Let	 CI(x,	 y,	 z)	 be	 the	 rest	 of	 the	




















I	 have	 proposed	 that	 impartings	 and	 expartings	 are	 mind-dependent	 changes.	 This	


















There	 are	 many	 interesting	 and	 difficult	 questions	 that	 we	 might	 ask	 about	 this	
phenomenon:	What	 does	 it	 take	 to	 have	 the	 appropriate	 authority?	What	 happens	
when	 there	 is	 a	 clash	 of	 decisions,	 with	 none	 trumping	 the	 rest?	 Is	 some	 kind	 of	
performance	 actually	 required?	 Does	 the	 change	 require,	 for	 its	 persistence,	 the	
persistence	 of	 the	 mental	 state	 that	 was	 involved	 in	 bringing	 it	 about?	 Are	 these	
changes	 actually	 brought	 about,	 or	 is	 it	 just	 community	 belief	 that	 they	 have	 been	
brought	 about	 that	 is	 brought	 about?	 (If	 the	 latter	 then	 this	 might	 explain	 why	 a	
performance	is	required,	if	it	is).	
	






















and	 falls	down	a	 long	 cliff,	never	 to	be	 seen	again.	Then	 the	bell	has	been	exparted	




is	 still	 part	 of	my	 bicycle,	 albeit	 a	 very	 remote	 one?	 It	 is	 no	 good	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	








There	 is	 something	 else	 to	 be	 careful	 of.	When	 you	 think	 about	 the	 situation	 that	 I	
have	described	you	might	be	adding	some	features	that	would	very	naturally	be	part	
of	 such	 a	 situation	 but	 that	 I	 haven’t	 actually	 specified.	 If	 such	 a	 thing	 actually	 did	
happen	 to	my	bell,	 I	might	well	 decide	 that	 it	 is	 no	 longer	part	of	my	bicycle,	 albeit	
subconsciously	and	very	quickly.	After	all,	what	would	be	the	point	of	maintaining	that	
it	 is	 still	 part	 of	 my	 bicycle,	 given	 that	 it’s	 never	 to	 be	 seen	 again?	 You	 might	 be	
imagining	that	to	be	part	of	the	situation,	because	it	would	be	a	very	natural	thing	to	
happen	in	such	a	situation.	 If	so	then	you	are	right	to	think	that	the	bell	 is	no	longer	





Objection.	 If	 my	 proposals	 about	 imparting	 and	 exparting	 are	 right,	 then	 we	 can	
change	the	mass	of	some	objects	just	by	thinking.	For	the	mass	of	a	complex	object	is	
determined	by	 the	mass	of	 its	parts.	According	 to	my	proposals,	we	 can	 change	 the	
parts	of	an	object	just	by	thinking	(by	making	appropriate	decisions).	And	that	means	




imparting	 x	 to	 y	 also	 requires	 attaching	 x	 to	 y,	 and	 exparting	 x	 from	y	 also	 requires	
detaching	 x	 from	y,	 then	we	 cannot	 change	 the	parts	of	 something	 just	by	 thinking,	
and	 so	we	 cannot	 change	 the	mass	 of	 something	 just	 by	 thinking.	 But	 I’m	 skeptical	
whether	attaching	and	detaching	are	required.	I’m	inclined	to	think	that	a	decision	can	
be	sufficient.	If	so,	then	I	bite	the	bullet	on	this	objection.	But	then	I	would	think	of	it	
as	 an	 interesting	 consequence.	 (Keep	 in	 mind:	 we’re	 not	 just	 deciding	 what	 the	




Objection.	 If	 my	 proposals	 about	 imparting	 and	 exparting	 are	 right,	 then	 ordinary	
objects	such	as	ships,	bicycles,	cars,	and	so	on,	can	travel	faster	than	light.	For	consider	
my	 bicycle	 in	my	 garage.	 I	 have	 a	 complete	 set	 of	 spares	 in	my	 back	 shed.	 I	might	
decide,	in	an	instant,	that	all	of	the	bicycle’s	current	parts	are	no	longer	parts,	and	that	
all	of	the	spare	parts	in	the	back	shed	are	now	parts.	In	doing	so	I	have,	in	an	instant,	
moved	my	 bicycle	 from	my	 garage	 to	my	 back	 shed	 –	 faster	 than	 light.	 But	 it	 can’t	
travel	faster	than	light	(as	physics	tells	us).	So	my	proposals	are	not	right.	
	
Reply.	 Again,	 it	 depends	 on	 what	 extra	 conditions	 are	 required	 for	 imparting	 and	
exparting.	If	imparting	x	to	y	also	requires	attaching	x	to	y,	and	exparting	x	from	y	also	









is	 the	 original	 ship	 we	 just	 need	 to	 figure	 out,	 each	 time	 a	 plank	 gets	moved	 from	
location	A	to	location	B,	whether	it	 is	still	a	part	of	the	original	ship	and,	each	time	a	









ship	 if	and	only	 if	 there	 is	a	z	such	that	z	decides	that	the	plank	 is	not	part	of	the	
original	ship	and	CE(the	plank,	the	original	ship,	z)	
	








whatever	 conditions	 are	 required,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 appropriate	 decision,	 for	 an	
imparting	to	occur,	which	include	similar	things.	
	






















the	original	 ship	has	exactly	 the	same	planks	as	 it	 started	with,	which	are	now	all	at	
















be	two	distinct	ships,	one	at	 location	A	and	one	at	 location	B,	 is	actually	 just	a	single	
ship	 partly	 at	 each	 location.	 Weird,	 but	 not	 impossible.	 (To	 help	 see	 that	 this	 is	
possible,	 consider	 the	 following	 variant	 case.	 Consider	 a	 car	 that	has	 a	 spare	wheel.	




looks	 like	 two	 cars,	 one	 towing	 the	 other,	 is	 just	 a	 single	 car,	 part	 of	 which	 is	 a	
complete	set	of	spares.)	
	










to	 an	 artifact,	 and	necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 something	 to	 be	 exparted	
from	an	artifact.	What	about	non-artifacts?	Consider	a	 tree.	What	does	 it	 take	 for	a	
leaf,	say,	to	be	imparted	to	a	tree?	And	what	does	it	take	for	a	leaf	to	be	exparted	from	
a	 tree?	Are	 the	 conditions	 the	 same	 as	 the	 ones	 that	 I	 have	 proposed	 for	 artifacts?	
That	doesn’t	seem	right	–	trees	had	leaves	as	parts	long	before	anyone	was	around	to	
make	 any	 decisions	 about	 parthood.	 But	 if	 imparting	 a	 leaf	 to	 a	 tree	 required	 a	
decision	then	those	leaves	could	never	have	become	parts	of	those	trees.	But	maybe	it	
is	 right?	Maybe	 trees	did	not	have	 leaves	as	parts	until	we	 came	along	and	decided	
them	 to	 be	 parts.	 I’m	 a	 little	 nervous	 about	 this	 idea,	 but	 it	 strikes	 me	 as	 worth	
considering.	Perhaps	my	proposals	apply	to	everything,	artifact	or	not.	
	
Confining	 our	 attention	 to	 artifacts,	 there	 is	 an	 interesting	 question	 of	 when	 some	




which	would	 require,	 according	 to	my	proposals,	 someone	 to	have	decided	 that	 the	
mug	is	part	of	 it	and	that	the	plate	is	part	of	 it.	 If	no	such	decisions	have	been	made	
then	neither	the	mug	nor	plate	are	part	of	it,	which	means	that	the	mug	and	plate	do	
not	 compose	 it,	 so	 there	 is	 no	 thing	 that	 the	 mug	 and	 plate	 compose.	 But	 if	 such	
decisions	have	been	made	then	there	might	be.	Note	that	it	would	be	very	easy	for	me	
to	 make	 these	 decisions,	 thereby	 making	 it	 the	 case	 that	 the	 mug	 and	 the	 plate	
compose	something,	which	is	perhaps	why	we	are	so	puzzled	about	whether	there	is	
something	that	they	compose.		
		
